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1 The Background 
There appears to be a strong, widespread consensus in 
the four windward Islands - Dominica, Grenada, st. Lucia 
and st. Vincent and the Grenadines - that there should 
be as soon as possible a political union of these 
states. The reasons in favour of unification are 
manifest: Each of the respective islands is a very small 
entity. In 1989 the population of the islands totalled 
1444,000 . The size of the national markets for goods, 
services and capital is extremely limited. The unit 
costs of public administration, social services and 
economic infrastructure are high. The bargaining power 
of the individual islands in negotiations wi th the big 
economic blocks - USA, EC and others - is rather negli­
gible. In a world in which more and more countries unite 
in regional organizations - the EC and ASEAN being the 
most prominent examples - the survi val of small states 
standing on their own is doomed to failure. 
So the endeavour of governments, political parties and 
NGOs in the windward Islands to establish a poli tical 
union deserves strong sympathy, encouragement and sup-
port, also from the outside world, the more as donor 
countries and international agencies would prefer to 
deal with one state instead of four. Though it is de-
plorable that the responsible pOliticians in the Leeward 
Islands at the moment are not prepared to join the uni-
1 Dominica: 82,000; Grenada: 100,000; st. Lucia: 
148,000; st. Vincent and the Grenadines: 114,000. 
Figures from: C. L. Mitchell: The Economic'Performance 
of the Windward Islands Regional Economy 1980-1989: 
Short-Term Prospects and Strategy for Development to 
1995. Economic Affairs Secretariat, st. John's, 
Antigua and Barbuda, October 1989. 
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2fication process , i t remains to be seen if they will 
change their minds wi thin some time. Much depends on 
what will happen in the next future. If the four states 
will succeed in what they are aiming at, their success 
story would certainly attract others. The fact alone 
that the Windward Islands are determined to uni te has 
already raised great attention in the Caribbean environ­
ment. 
In the meantime the four governments have agreed upon 
establishing a Regional Constituent Assembly (RCA) as an 
initial forum for consultation among the peoples. of 
their respecti ve states. This ini tiati ve has been wel­
comed by the public at large, though the Standing Com­
mittee of Popular Democratic Parties of the Eastern 
Caribbean (SCOPE) had in the beginning some reservations 
concerning certain details of the terms of reference. 
The task of the RCA according to the Inter-Governmental 
Agreement of 14 January, 1991 shall be 
to consider and advise on the question of windward 
Islands political union with specific reference to 
the economic and social viability of the union, the 
economic cost of union and the external relations 
and administrative implications of the union; 
to consider and advise on the possible forms of 
union, that is, whether the proposed union should be 
a state which is federal, unitary or of some other 
form; 
to consider and advise on the structure of govern­
me nt and elements of a consti tution which would be 
2 Prime Minister V. C. Bird Sr. of Antigua and Barbuda 
justified his reluctance to any union by the strange 
argument that his country did not want to be recol­
onized. 
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most appropriate to the union, including the admin­
3istrative and electoral mechanisms . 
The RCA consists of (originally 40, now) 44 delegates, 
being 11 persons from each island. They are selected 
from Parliament and poli tical parties (5) and from the 
private sector , the trade unions, the churches, youth 
groups, women organizations and the farming community 
(6). Four meetings have been planned in rotation in each 
of the Windward Islands: January, February, Mc;irch and 
April, 1991. This time-schedule, however, could not be 
complied with. Until now - August, 1991 - only two ses­
sions were held: the first one from 14-18 January, 1991 
in st. Vincent and the Grenadines; the second one from 
22-26 April, 1991 in st. Lucia. The next meeting is to 
be held from 2-6 September, 1991 in Dominica and the 
fourth and last one is envisaged for January, 1992 in 
Grenada. The first two sessions dealt with principle 
matters: discussing the need of a poli tical union as 
such and debating the type the union shall have. 
Though the general support for a poli tical union seems 
to be quite vigorous, the views of what form and 
features this union should have, differ considerably. 
Federal vs. unitarian state, republic vs. monarchy, uni­
cameral vs. bicamerai legislature, free or restricted 
movement of persons and business acti vi ti es : these are 
only a few examples of the far-reaching area of con­
flicting opinions. A solution can only be found, if 
there is a willingness of the different groups and their 
representati ves to compromise since the decision for a 
3 See Annex to Agreement Establishing a Constituent Re­
gional Assembly of the Windward Islands, sect. 4. 
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union which the four islands merge in has to surpass 
high barriers: It requires the amendment of their 
respective constitution by a bill passed by a qualified 
4majority in Parliament and approved by a referendum . 
My contribution to the debate is not a poli tical one. 
Being an outsider I have to refrain from telling people 
what they should do. Anyhow, they will know better which 
solutions are the most appropriate in forming a union. 
What I can do and will do is trying to clarify legal, 
i. e. constitutional implications of diverse political 
options and to give an input from experiences which have 
been made elsewhere, especially in my home country 
Germany and in the European communi ty . What I have to 
contribute is less by giving self-confident answers but 
more by asking questions , questions that may open the 
minds for looking at al ternati ve perspecti ves . It goes 
without saying that I cannot cover all the issues which 
have been disputed so far, but, hopefully, I will deal 
with the.most important ones. 
4 Dominica: three-quarters majority of the members of 
the House of Assembly and the majority of the votes 
cast on the referendum (sect. 4 2  (2) and (3) of the 
Consti tution ) j Grenada: two-thirds majori ty of the 
Representatives and two-thirds majority of the votes 
in the referendum (sect. 38 (2) and (3) of the Con­
stitution) j St. Lucia: three-quarters majority of the 
members of the House and the majority of the votes in 
the referendum (sect. 4 1  of the constitution) ; st. 
Vincent: two-thirds majority of the representatives 
and two-thirds of the votes in the referendum (sect. 
38 (2) and (3) of the Constitution) . 
It is strange that constitutions which' have been 
strongly influenced by the United Kingdom require a 
referendum for their amendment since the British 
political system is traditionally immune to any 
plebiscitary elements. 
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2 The Aim 
2.1 The Future of the Union: Unitarian vs. Federal 
State 
2.1.1 Same General Observations 
One of the main controversial issues in the debate on 
the future union is its form: Should it be a unitarian 
or a federal state? There is no need of- explaining the 
well-known meaning of those terms. A lot of intellectual 
energy has been devoted to arguing about the pros and 
cons of uni tarianism and federalism respecti vely. But 
instead of absorbing oneself in this abstract dispute 
about the advantages and disadvantages of rather 
puristic concepts, it might be more appropriate to 
choose a pragmatic approach. The question then will be: 
What can be ruled and governed by the centre of the 
union without destroying the historical, social and 
pali tical identi ti es of the four islands? And what can 
be left to the self-government of the states wi thout 
endangering the cohesion and efficiency of the union? 
Even a strang central government, as favoured by the 
majority of the ReA, does not necessarily imply that 
each and everything has to be decided upon by the 
centre; on the contrary I experience from Europe shows 
that in a strictly centralized state either the periph­
eries atrophy, loosing their vitality, or fight the cen­
tral power thus threatening the very existence of the 
whole political fabric. Reversely, it is evident that a 
union in which the centre is more or less dependent on 
the good will and cooperation of the states cannot func­
tion efficiently; strains and tensions will' easily lead 
to a collapse of the system. So the middle course could 
be: as many powers as necessary for the well-being of 
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the union should go to the centre and as many compe­
tences as desirable in the interest of the local needs 
should go to the states. This model - you may call it a 
federation, a mixed system or whatsoever - has also the 
benefit o� avoiding a radical and costly structural 
change: If the political and administrative powers would 
be vested exclusively in the centre, this would entail 
the establishment of an entirely different system. New 
governmental and administrative bodies had to be buil t 
up: a time-consuming and expensive procedure which 
inevi tably would create frictions and, at least in the 
beginning, a lack of efficiency of the services to the 
public. The pragmatic approach could avoid such draw­
backs provided that there is a fair distribution of 
legislative, executive and judiciary powers between the 
central and the states governments. This balanced 
solution would also serve the interests of the citizens, 
since i t prevents the concentration of competences in 
one centrei the horizontal division of powers, 
supplementing the vertical one, could protect the 
individual additionally from undue state interference in 
his or her life. Finally, this mixed political system 
might encourage other islands of the Eastern Caribbean 
or the Caribbean at large to join the union, as they 
need not fear to enter a community which offers them no 
opportun i ty of maintaining their own identi ty . In any 
case, the consti tution of the union, which percei ves 
i tself as the nucleus of a broader poli tical enti ty, 
should contain an explicit clause giving other states in 
the Caribbean the right to join it. 
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2.1.2 Conclusions 
2.1.2.1 Legislation 
The constitution of the union has to draw a clear line 
between legislative powers of the union and of the 
5states . Usually, in a mixed system one distinguishes 
between exclusive, concurrent and residual competences. 
The exclusive responsibility of the union could comprise 
e. g. foreign affairs, defence, customs, immigration and 
emigration, union citizenship, economy (trade and in­
6dustry, banking, planning) , tertiary education . 
Concurrent competences could extend a. o. to police, pri­
mary and secondary education, tourism, electricity, 
water supply, sewage, roads. Because of the possibility 
of overlapping law in the concurrent areas the constitu­
tion should provide that union law shall take precedence 
over state law. Whether there will be a list of subjects 
exclusive to the states - e. g. cultural affairs, local 
government - remains to be discussed. In any case, the 
constitution must provide for the attribution of resi-
5 Cf. Patrick Emmanuel: The Distribution of Powers and 
Functions in Federal-Type Countries. A Document Pre­
pared for the Regional Constituent Assembly of the 
Windward Islands: Meeting in st. Lucia, April 22-25, 
1991. This paper gives a useful survey of constitu­
tional distribution of legislative powers in 
Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria and switzerland. 
6 During the second meeting of the RCA there was a con­
sensus among those favouring a federal-type constitu­
tion that legislati ve powers should be reserved to 
the central government in the fOllowing areas: de­
fence, national security, foreign relations and re­
presentation abroad, customs, immigration, economic 
planning, higher education, audit, aviation, maritime 
matters, joined purchasing. Cf. Chairman's Summary of 
the Consensus of the Second Meeting of the RCA. st. 
Lucia, July 1991., p. 2 f. 
For the distribution of legislative powers concerning 
taxation cf. 2. 1. 2. 4 .  
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dual sUbjects which are listed neither as exclusive nor 
as concurrent. In this context one may draw some lessons 
from the outside world: In Germany e . g. these matters 
are reserved to the states, in India to the union; the 
Canadian constitution reserves to the provinces gen­
erally all matters of a mere local or private nature. In 
the interest of flexibility it might be worth-while re­
flecting the possibility whether the constitution should 
open the way for a transfer of legislative powers from 
the states to the centre and vice versa. For example the 
constitution could provide that any state or all of them 
can request central government to take oyer legislation 
on a specific matter which originally has been vested in 
7the responsibility of the states . 
No matter what type the legislature will have - unicam­
eral or bicameral - there will be at least a union 
Assembly, House of Assembly, House of Representatives -
however one may call it - which consists of deputies who 
are elected for a specific term in general, direct, 
free, equal and secret ballot. The Assembly being the 
most important institution in the union should reflect 
in its composition the broad range of political, ideolo­
gical and social currents and trends of the union elec­
torate as a whole. 
7 Emmanuel (cf. footnote 5, p. 4 f. ) quotes a provision 
of the Australian constitution according to which fe­
deral authority extends to 'matters referred to the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or 
Parliaments of any state or states, but so that the 
Law shall extend only to states by whose Parliament 
the matter is referred or which afterwards adopt the 
law' . 
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Therefore the choice of the electorate system is of ut­
8most importance . Insofar i t might be wise to include 
the principle rules concerning i t in the consti tution 
9i tself . An electoral system based on the principle of 
simple majority in which the candidate is elected who 
gains the highest number of votes in his or her consti­
tuency (first-past-the-post system) , though having the 
advantage of being easy to administer, implies the dan­
ger of being unfair. As experience shows it may happen 
that a party which has won less than 50 per cent of the 
votes recei ves all or almost all seats in Parliament 
and, reversely,. a party wi th a considerable bulk of the 
votes, say 30 per cent, is not represented in the House 
at all. Under such circumstances Parliament would not 
really mirror the diversity of the electorate. Measured 
against this, a system based on proportional representa­
tion appears to be by far more appropriate. It has, of 
course, the disadvantage that the dependency of the de­
puties on their respective party is rather strong: 
8 Cf. Earl Huntley: The Union of East Caribbean states 
- Thoughts on a Form. St. Lucia, May 1988 ,  p. 18 , 
26 ff. i Patrick Emmanuel: The Windward Islands: The 
Electoral System. April, 1991. 
9 The constitutions of the four Windward Islands con­
tain general provisions regarding the method by which 
Representatives are to be elected to Parliament: Each 
of the constituencies in which the countries are 
divided shall return one Representative to the House 
who shall be directly elected in such a manner as may 
be prescribed by or under any law (sect. 33 ( 1 ) of 
the Dominica Constitutioni sect. 32 (1) of the Gre­
nada Constitution; sect. 33 (1) of the st. Lucia Con­
stitution; sect. 27 (1) of the st. Vincent Constitu­
tion) . Thus the law could introduce an election pro­
cedure based on simple majority (like in Britain) or, 
if there are three or more candidates, open the way 
for a second ballot held between the first two candi­
dates (.\like in France) . Up to now in all the four 
Windward Islands the simple majority system has pre­
vailed. 
9. 
Without being placed on their party's list they have no 
chance of being elected. Moreover, if various parties 
take part in election, this system may lead to a splin­
tering in the composition of Parliament thus endangering 
the formation of a working majority. This risk, however, 
could be diminished by determining a minimum_percentage 
of total votes for a party in order to receive seats in 
Parliament. That is, e. g. , the case in- Germany and in 
10the Scandinavian countries . 
If proportional representation is adopted, it has to be 
clarified whether the parties present their lists in one 
single union constituency or in four state consti­
tuencies. Whatever decision will be made, i t will have 
important repercussions: One single consti tuency would 
favour evidently the development of union-wide party or-
10 For information purposes it might be interesting to 
describe a mixed model as it is applied in Germany. 
It combines elements of proportional representation 
with those of the simple majority system. Each voter 
has two votes. with the first he/she chooses a deputy 
for his/her consti tuency i the candidate gaining the 
highest number of votes is elected. By this way half 
the seats in Parliament are distributed. With the se­
cond vote the voter chooses between the lists pre­
sented to the electorate by the different parties. 
The total number of seats a party receives in Parlia­
ment is dependent on i ts percentage of the second 
votes. If, for example, a party has won 30 per cent 
of the second votes, it receives 197 of the total of 
656 seatsi if, to keep to this example, 100 of its 
candidates have been directly elected in their con­
stituencies, the rest of 97 seats is given the candi­
dates in the party list according to the order deter­
mined by the party. In any case, a party must at 
least receive 5 per cent of the second votes or win 
three seats in direct election to be represented in 
Parliament. 
This system has proved to be a fair procedure and is 
now weIl established in Germany. However, it might be 
too complicated and expensive for being transferred 
to the Caribbean. 
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ganizations and thus contribute to a political mentality 
focusing on union matters. On the other hand, by prefer­
ring four separate island constituencies, one would 
probably retain the parochial party structure and a 
political debate concentrating on insular affairs. 
Considering the consequences the future electoral system 
will have for the composition of the union Assembly the 
designing of this system is not just a technical matter. 
It is a decision of highest political priority with im­
portant constitutional repercussions. 
Should the electoral system of the future union be based 
on some sort of proportional representation, the influ­
ence of parties on union, at least on island level will 
increase considerably, since it is them who present the 
list of candidates and determine the order in which they 
are placed. With regard to that it might be commendable 
to give the parties and their role in forming the poli­
tical will of the people some thought also in the con­
stitutional debate. The constitution could e. g. provide 
that parties may be freely established, but that their 
internal organization shall conform to democratic prin­
ciples. In any case, it would be in the interest of a 
fair and open pOlitical process to force the parties to 
account publicly for the sources and use of their funds 
11and for their assets . Whether they should be prohibited 
from receiving foreign financial support, is also an 
issue which should be reflected. 
11 This is, e. g. , what article 21 (1) of the Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany provides. 
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There has been some discussion about what should be done 
12in case of representati ves crossing the floor . There 
are constitutions which require a member of the house to 
vacate his or her seat, if he/she resigns from his/her 
13party . The problem with such rulings is that they rein­
force the dependence of the deputies on their respective 
party. This could mean in the end that the Parliamen­
tarian group of a party is nothing more than an extended 
arm of the party's leadership - in contrast to the clas­
sie perception of the deputy as being the representative 
of the whole people, not bound by orders and instruc­
14tions from anybody and subject only to his conscience . 
This independence should be maintained. A party should 
have other means and possibilities to secure the loyalty 
of the deputies whom it has placed as their candidates. 
There has been much debate on the structure of the 
15 legislative body: Should it be uni- or bicameral? The 
unicameral system has the advantage of the legislative 
procedure being rather quiek and smooth. On the other 
hand, by a bicameral system interests and experiences 
could be integrated in the legislative debate which 
otherwise would be too easily neglected. A second cham­
ber could be made up by the Heads of Government of the 
12 Cf. K. D. Anthony: Some Issues Pertaining to the Com­
position, Powers and Officers of Parliament. March, 
1991, p. 9 f. 
13 E. g. Trinidad and Tobago where a member of the House 
is required to vacate his seat if, having been a can­
didate of a party and elected to the House, he re­
signs from or is expelled by that party. Cf. also the 
constitutions of Antigua and Barbuda and of Nigeria. 
For details: Anthony (footnote 12), p. 9 f. 
14 Thus the wording being used in article 38 (1) of the 
Basic Law of Germany. 
15 K. D. Anthony (footnote 12), p. 1 ff. 
12 
four islands. The benefit of this solution, apart from 
being not expensive and easy to realize, would be that 
it gives the governments of the iSlands, being respons i­
ble for the bulk of administration of union law, a share 
in the decision-making process of the legislature. 
Another model could be a second chamber composed 
entirely or partly of representati ves of NGOs: trade 
unions, business, churches, women and youth organiza­
tions etc. But there is the difficul t question of what 
group should be represented and how to guarantee the le­
gitimation of their representatives. A further alterna­
tive would be a Senate with Senators directly elected in 
the four islands. Though such system has been success­
fully applied in some bigger states (e. g. USA) it might 
be questionable, whether it is useful for a small union 
like that of the Windward Islands. It appears rather 
complicated - since i t entails two elections for two 
different types of people' s representcition - and i t is 
costly. Finally, one could think of a model in which the 
first chamber is composed of members directly elected in 
their constituencies according to the first-past-the­
post system and the members of the second chamber being 
elected simultaneously through party lists on the basis 
of proportional representation. 
It should be clarified by constitutional provision for 
what period the House is to be elected (4 or 5 years) 
and under which circumstances and by whom it may be dis­
solved before the expiry of that term. To prevent an 
abuse of the power of dissolution its execution should 
not depend on the discretion of any person (President, 
Prime Minister) , but be bound to specific prerequisites. 
There should be provisions in the union constitution 
concerning the initiative for legislation. One could 
13 
imagine. three al ternati ve or cumulati ve possibili ties: 
bills initiated by the Executive, by a certain number of 
members of the House of Representati ves andjor by the 
second chamber, if there is one. One will have to cla­
rify whether the second chamber should have the right to 
delay or veto some legislation and under which condi­
tions a veto could be overridden by the first chamber. 
If the second chamber is composed of the Heads of 
Government of the iSlands, i t would be appropriate to 
endow it with a veto power as far as the execution of 
laws is in the responsibility of their respective 
governments. 
One might also consider the possibili ty of introducing 
additional plebiscitary elements in the constitution, as 
i t is the case in some other countries , like Swi tzer­
land. If e.g. a popular initiative of a bill is sup­
ported by 10 per cent of the electorate and not subse­
quently passed by Parliament, a referendum could take 
pI ace to decide upon the bill. In order to prevent 
demagogie campaigns at the cost of government and other 
groups of society the plebisci tary instrument should, 
however, not apply to money-bills. In any case, one has 
to keep in mind that plebisci tes are rather expensi ve 
and may therefore be beyond the financial capacity of 
government. 
Insofar as there would be a mixed system in the union -
with a division of legislative powers between the centre 
and the states - the legislatures in the islands could 
be kept as they are hitherto. However, their law-making 
powers will be reduced to areas which are not reserved 
to the union legislature. Some considerati6n might be 
gi ven to tbe question whether the election to the is­
lands Parliaments should coincide with that of the union 
14 
Parliament. Practical reasons tell against this possi­
bility, for instance in case one of the legislatures 
would be dissolved prematurely, i. e. be fore its normal 
term of office expires. 
2.1.2.2 Executive16 
The principle function of the Executive will be to exe­
cute and enforce the law of the union, to prepare and 
initiate legislation, to maintain law and order, to pro­
vide services and to take responsibility of the foreign 
affairs. The Executive (or part of it) has also to re­
present the union, a function which is reserved to the 
head of state. So the question arises whether he or she 
should be a representative of Her Majesty (Governor­
General) - as at present in Grenada, st. Lucia and st. 
vincent - or be an elected person (President) - as it is 
the case in Dominica -, in other words: whether the 
union sh�uld be a monarchy or a republic. There appears 
to be a broad consensus in the RCA and the public at 
large that the union has to be a republic. But this op­
tion does not sol ve all and everything. There remains 
16 See K. D. Anthony: Constitutional Status of the Execu­
tive: An Overview. March, 1991. Huntley (footnote 8 ), 
p. 14 ff. , 24 ff. i Simon C. R. Mclntosh: Toward OECS 
Political Union: Thoughts on a possible Constitu­
tional Model (no information about year and pI ace of 
publication) . Nicholas J. o. Li verpool : Windward Is­
lands Political Union: A Model of Union with an Exe­
cutive Head of State and Head of Government. A Paper 
Prepared for the Meeting of the Regional Constituent 
Assembly of the Windward Islands to be Held at 
Roseau, Dominica, september 2-6, 1991 i Patrick A. M. 
Emmanuel: Windward Islands Political Union: The Model 
of Uni tarian Union wi th separate Head of - State and 
Head of Government (prime Minister) . A Paper Prepared 
for the Regional Constituent Assembly of the Windward 
Islands, Meeting at Roseau, Dominica, September 2-6, 
1991. 
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the problem of how the Executive is to be organized: 
Should the President be just a ceremonial head of state 
- in this case his or her election by Parliament may 
suffice or exert also executive functions then 
his/her legitimation would demand rather a direct vote 
of the people - ? The first al ternati ve would imply a 
Prime Minister or cabinet system in which the executive 
powers are vested in the eabinet headed by a Prime 
Minister with the eonsequenee that the President ean aet 
only on adviee of the Prime Minister. The President will 
appoint to the offiee of Prime Minister a member of the 
union Assembly who appears to be likely to eommand the 
17support of the majority of the members of the Assembly
-
. 
The eontinuanee of the Prime Minister in offiee will 
also depend on this prerequisite. (Beeause of eabinet's 
dependenee on Parliament this exeeutive model is also 
ealled the Parliamentarian system. ) Should the House 
pass a resolution of no eonfidenee, the President will 
18have to remove the Prime Minister from offiee . However, 
to prevent that a purely obstruetionist majority could 
lead to the dismissal of the Prime Minister and his/her 
cabinet, wi th the resul t that the exeeution of govern­
ment affairs will be paralyzed, the eonstitution may 
provide - s
17 Cf. the respeetive provisions in the eonstitutions of 
the Windward Islands, more or less identieal with the 
only differenee that in Grenada, st. Lueia and st. 
vineent it is the Governor-General who appoints the 
Prime Minister, while in Dominiea it is the President 
who makes the appointment: Dominiea: seet. 59 ( 2) ; 
Grenada: seet. 58 (2); st. Lueia: seet. 60 (2); st. 
vineent: seet. 51 (2). · 
18 Sueh are the basie provisions in the eonstitutions of 
the windward Islands: Dominiea: seet. 59 (6); Gre­
nada: seet. 59 (6a); st. Lueia: seet. 60 (6); st. 
vineent: seet. 51 (6). 
16 
.imilar to a regulation in the Basie Law of 

table than in the case of a seven year term. Should the 
term of office and the election of the President coin­
cide with the term of office and the election of Parlia­
ment? Such coincidence appears to be problematic, as the 
possibility cannot be excluded that the House could be 
dissolved prematurely. Should the position of Prime 
Minister be maintained in a presidential system? If 
there is a strong central government, as favoured by the 
great majority of the RCA, there seems to be no need for 
preserving this office. Should there be a constitutional 
arrangement which guarantees a rotation of office-hol­
ders among representatives of the different islands? The 
counter-argument here could be that such a procedure 
would rather reinforce centrifugal tendencies instead of 
mObilizing all the energies for nation-building. 
Finally, the constitution must deal with the responsi­
bility for the implementation of union la�O. As far as 
foreign affairs, customs, external trade a. o. are con­
cerned, the administration of these matters will be as­
signed tq central government unities. Most of the other 
areas could be dealt with by the existing administrative 
21 units in the islands which could mean that they retain 
their own public services with possibly different scale 
and salary structures. The central government, however, 
should have the right to gi ve instructions in order to 
secure a harmonious implementation of the union law 
throughout the islands. 
20 Cf. The Implication for Public Administration of a 
Windward Islands Political Union (no author named) , 
November, 1990. 
21 Thus the proposal of the RCA in its second meeting. 
Cf. Chairman's Summary (footnote 6), p. 3. 
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2 2 • 1 • 2 • 3 JUdiciary2
The structure of the Judiciary may cause the least pro­
blems in shaping the union constitution. As soon as the 
Eastern caribbean Supreme Court will resume i ts juris­
diction over Grenada, the OECS court system, incl uding 
the High Courts in the four islands, could carry on its 
functions in the union. There remains, however, the 
question whether there should be in the future one 
single legal service incorporating also the Magistrates. 
23 2.1.2.4 Finance
The financial structure of the future union is one of 
the most sensi ti ve issues. What form i t will have de­
pends to a large degree on what political form the union 
will have. If it is a purely unitarian state, the power 
of levying taxes has to be exclusively assigned to the 
central government which also will collect the taxes and 
will receive all tax revenues. If the union, however, is 
a mixed system, the responsibilities for tax legisla­
tion, tax collection and tax receipts have to be distri­
buted between the central government and the states (and 
among the states). In this case, one has to prevent that 
central government taxes are merely superimposed on the 
existing tax regimes in the islands. Otherwise overtaxa­
tion resul ting in tax evasion and tax resistance would 
be the inevitable outcome. On the other hand, though the 
states would apply their own taxes, there is the need of 
a certain uniformity in income, corporate and value-ad­
ded taxes in order to harmonize the tax conditions for 
22 Cf. N.J.O. Liverpool: The Form and Structure of the 
Union: The Judiciary. March, 1991. 
23 S.St.A. Clarke: Four Issues in Public Sector Finan­
cing, November, 1990. 
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business activities throughout the islands i insofar le­
gislative powers should be included at least in the con­
current competences while the responsibility for taxes 
on external trade, i.e. in particular customs; should be 
24gi ven exclusi vely to the central Parliament . It is a 
matter of calculation, depending on the political struc­
ture of the union, how the revenues from centrally 
legislated taxes ( e . 9 . customs, income, corporate and 
value-added taxes) are to be distributed between the 
central government on the one hand and the states on the 
other. 
An issue which has also to be clarified is how to deal 
wi th the ( external) debts of the existing islands. If 
the union should take over responsibility for this bur­
den, a previous consolidation of the debts will be a ne­
cessary prerequisite. 
2.2 _Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The fact that the four Windward Islands consti tutions 
contain each a Bill of Rights does not mean that funda­
mental rights need not be included in the union consti­
tution. since the union will be a new state on its own 
wi th agencies acting on i ts behalf, people have to be 
protected against unlawful interference in their per­
sonal liberty and property by central government autho­
ri ties . Technically, i t should be rather easy to iden-
24 At present the tax regimes in the four Windward Is­
lands differ considerably. While Dominica, st. Lucia 
and st. vincent derive their revenues from a mix of 
direct and indirect taxes, Grenada has abandoned in­
come tax and introduced a value-added tax as the main 
source of public income i i t has retained, however I 
the real property tax and raises also a so-called 
business levy. 
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tify and formulate the fundamental rights as to be eon­
stitutionally guaranteed. The almost identieal Bills of 
Rights in the existing eonsti tutions of Dominiea, Gre­
nada, St. Lueia and st. vineent eould serve as basie 
material for this purpose. 
One of the main diffieulties in this eontext is the 
question of seeuring freedom of movement whieh eomprises 
the right to move freely throughout the union, to reside 
in any part of it, to enter it and to leave it and to be 
25immune to expulsion from the territory of the union . It 
means also that any person of any Windward Island will 
be entitled to work, to da business and to buy land in 
any other island wi thin the union. It is exaetly this 
perspeeti ve whieh ereates irritation in poli tieal eir­
eIes, trade unions and other groups. People fear that an 
invasion of eompetitors for jobs, business opportunities 
and land-purehase will oeeur. In order to damp these 
fears it eould be wise to introduee a transitional pe­
riod - with eertain restrietions on freedom of movement 
to be removed only step by step - be fore giving full ae­
eess to this right. 
The Bills of Right in the eonstitutions of the Windward 
Islands, following a more or less identieal pattern, 
eontain the elassie freedoms: proteetion of right to 
life and personal liberty, proteetion from slavery and 
foreed labour, proteetion from inhuman treatment, pro­
teetion from depri vation of property, proteetion from 
arbitrary seareh or entry, freedom of eonseienee and of 
expression, freedom of movement, proteetion from diseri­
mination a.s.o. The eonstitutions, however, do not gua-
25 Cf. the almost homonymous wording of the islands eon­
stitutions in their respeetive seetion 12 (1). 
rantee social, cul tural and ecological rights, for in­
stance the right to work, the right to a decent dwel­
ling, the right to social security, the right to educa­
26tion, the right of having a non-polluted environment . 
Whether the constitution of the union should also gua­
rantee this type of rights, will probably be an in­
tensely disputed issue in further discussions. One 
should, however, consider that social, cultural and eco­
logical rights differ from the classic ones insofar as 
they are not enforceable by the courts. Moreover, since 
the government would not be able to fulfil all these 
rights - going far beyond i ts 'limi ted resources - the 
constitution would promise more than the government 
could actually keep. This again would lead to disap-
pointment and frustration, undermine value and virtue of 
the constitution and end anger the stability of the state 
as a whole. Therefore the drafters of the consti tution 
might be weIl advised to exclude this type of fundamen­
tal rights from the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, 
the consti tution could certainly oblige government, in 
the form of an objective duty, to take over social, cul­
tural and ecological responsibili ties, leaving the de­
tails of realizing this obligation to law passed by Par­
27liament . 
26 There is one interesting exception: sect. 1 lit. d of 
the Grenada Constitution secures the right to work. 
27 An interesting example is the term "social state" or 
"social government" in the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany which is far more than just a 
ni ce word for nothing but is at least a guarantee of 
a certain minimum standard of social securi ty. The 
legislature must not pass a bill that contravenes 
this minimum standard. 
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2.3 The Capital of the Union 
For many people the question of where the capital of the 
union, its political centre, should be will play an im­
portant role, though one should not overestimate this 
issue: Washington, for instance, is the capital of the 
USA, but New York is by far more influential i Canberra, 
e. g. , being the capi tal of Australia, cannot outweigh 
the economic, cul tural and also the poli tical standing 
of Melbourne and Sydney. 
Nevertheless, one should try to find a fair solution by 
which none of the islands feels neglected. For that pur­
pose the seats of various important governmental bodies 
could be distributed to different island capitals: e. g. 
the seat of the Executive, of Parliament, of the Public 
Service Commission, of the Judicial service Commission. 
In view of modern communication technology the coopera­
tion of these organs, though locally separated, should 
not create greater difficulties. 
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3 The Way 
There is no doubt that the unification of the Windward 
Islands, as desirable as it appears, is rather difficult 
an endeavour. The RCA most likely will not solve all the 
problems in just four meetings. Therefore it would be of 
no surprise, should additional sessions take place. 
Anyhow, to expect that all the conflicts and diverse 
opinions can be reduced to a co�on denominator within a 
few months is qui te unrealistic. If the foundation of 
the union should be accompanied by the enactment of a 
full-fledged constitutiop the unification process will 
probably last till Doomsday. For that reason it might be 
commendable to aim at an agreement only on some elemen­
tary constitutional issues and to leave all the rest to 
the further development of the union as a new state. 
Such an open, flexible constitution, based on a dilatory 
formal compromise, may pave the way to step by step so­
lutions in the years to come. 
What are the elementary provisions this consti tution , 
flexible as it may be, should have as a minimum? 
It should establish a provisional central legisla­
ture made up of delegates from the existing island 
Parliaments, e. g. fi ve per country, according to 
their political composition. 
It should determine that this legislature is to be 
replaced after a specific period of time by a freely 
elected Parliament according to an electoral bill 
passed by the provisional legislature. 
It should gi ve this union Parliament a minimum of 
legislative powers, especially on for�ign pOlicy, 
def ence , external trade ( incl uding customs ), immi-
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gration and emigration, higher education, aviation 
and maritime matters. 
It should enable the transfer of legislative powers 
from one or more island legislatures to the central 
Parliament. 
It should decide upon the form of government: repub­
lic or monarchy. 
It should establish a collecti ve Executi ve composed 
of the Heads of Government in the four iSlands, the 
post of President (in a republic) or Prime Minister 
(in a monarchy) rotating yearly among the members of 
the Executive in the alphabetical order of the 
states they represent or in any other reasonable or­
der. 
It should empower the Executive to execute and en­
force union law, prepare and ini tiate legislation, 
take responsibility of foreign affairs, defence 
a.s.o. and establish a union public service for the 
matters assigned to the union. 
It should apportion a minimum percentage of the 
customs revenues to central government as a pro­
visional financial basis for its activities. 
It should include a Bill of Rights similar to that 
in the existing consti tutions of the windward Is­
lands; initial restrictions on freedom of movement 
of workers and freedom of establishment could be 
abolished by progressive stages and by the end of a 
28specific transitional period latest . 
It should contain a provision which gives other OECS 
states the right to join the union with equal rights 
and obligations. 
28 Cf. e.g. articles 48  and 52 of the EEC Treaty. 
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This core constitution had to be adopted or at least to 
be enabled by constitutional amendments in the four is­
lands, a procedure which requires a bill passed by a 
qualified majority (two thirds or three quarters) of the 
members of the respective House and, additionally, ap­
proved by the respective electorate in a referendum 
29(partly by two thirds of the votes cast) . 
To open the way for a comprehensive constitution this 
bill could empower the union legislature to amend and 
complete the core consti tution step by step, according 
to needs and experiences, provided that certain require­
ments are met, e.g. three-quarters majority of the mem­
bers of the union Assembly and two-thirds majori ty of 
the members of the respective Houses in the four states. 
Before starting the formal procedure of unification i t 
might be desirable - as it has been considered already -
to consult first the people in the islands giving them 
the possibili ty to express their views: whether they 
want or whether they refuse a union as a sovereign new 
state in which their hitherto separate sovereign states 
merge. This could happen in the form of a referendum si­
multaneously to be held in the different islands. By an 
overwhelmingly posi ti ve resul t of this plebisci te the 
unification process would gather further momentum. 
In any case there appears to be a strong need of broad 
discussion in and among all sectors of society. Without 
making people understand what unification means, without 
communicating with them and consulting them all efforts 
and energies of politicians and NGO representatives 
fighting for unification will be wasted. 
29 For details see footnote 4 .  
26 
